recombine analytical assumptions about those regimes of regulation in order to lay a more realistic and less ethnocentric basis for its comparative study.
The growing influence of conversion-led movements and the legitimacy of 'religion as belief' as distinct from 'religion as heritage' has major implications for inherited arrangements governing regimes of religious regulation. The absence of hierarchical institutions able to act as 'interlocuteurs valables' authorized to speak on behalf of 'religion as a whole' leads to the near-impossibility of a broad consensual basis for a delimitation of the boundaries between religion and the state. At the same time, there is something like a lag-effect whereby the followers of new Christian movements and of predominantly immigrant-based religions invoke their entitlement to ancient exemptions, privileges and recognitions still accorded to hierarchical Christian institutions whose support is declining. The underlying once-prevalent and deeply Christian cultural assumption that religion is entitled to certain exemptions because it is reliant on a hierarchy of virtuosi who make great sacrifices on behalf of the world as a whole ) is lost, yet the corresponding entitlements and exemptions are not. What we see instead are new forms of the politicization of religion, and the use of religious privilege to claim inherited exemptions and entitlements. This means that non-religious interests can take advantage of exemptions and privileges reserved for identifiable religious institutions to promote agendas such as multiculturalism, anti-racism, or, conversely, cultural and racial exclusiveness, in addition to campaigns of moral salvation focused on the politics of marriage, reproduction and the body. To these can be added New Age, Yoga, alternative physical and psychological therapies which invoke a non-material spirituality but do not possess a theology or an ethos for society, let alone institutional arrangements for their representation or doctrinal legitimation -adding up to a 'newstyle' religion as Linda Woodhead calls it, though one may doubt whether they truly qualify for the term. As a result of these reflections, the article challenges a fundamental but unarticulated assumption of market theorists and others, namely that the more and the more intensely religion is practiced, and the more open the religious field, the greater the benefits for society as a whole. Following Ernest Gellner and Chris Hann, I provide a less dismissive account of the regime of religious recognition and attenuated monopoly which emerged in Western Europe, in which certain churches existed for nations as a whole, and thus functioned as open institutions, and a more sceptical account of the absolutism of religious freedom policies. Of course, I recognize that these national, or hegemonic, churches are not always open to everyone and that their hegemony is, to varying degrees, at the expense of minority religions and sometimes minority ethnic groups.
While the point of departure is Europe, the US and Brazil are adduced for comparison and conceptual clarification: the US case shows that a radical negation of state regulation of religion has led to endless uncertainty and litigation over what counts as religious, and maybe sharpened and embittered political conflict. Its legal and political framework shifts in accordance with the changing balance of political forces.
Nowhere do the problems of delimitation arising from 'religion as belief' and 'conversion-led movements' appear as sharply as in the US. In Brazil, in contrast, which is heir to a long tradition of religious quasi-monopoly so decried by market theorists, a veritable revolution, quantitative and qualitative, in the religious practices of the population -admittedly, and significantly, without much immigration or cultural transplantation such as has occurred in Europe -has occurred with few tensions in the political arena and (thus far) with nothing like the 'culture wars' observed in the US, even though since the 1988 Constitution the regulatory regime is similar to the US.
In conclusion, I claim that contemporary tensions around religion arise because of (a) a shift in the nature of religious claims from heritage-based to a basis in personal belief; (b) the influence of conversion-led movements and the non-availability of impersonal or impartial criteria for the recognition and adjudication of claims for religious exemption and privilege; (c) the legacy of exemptions and privileges formerly accorded to religious institutions; and (d) the political instrumentalization of religion, though this last point awaits development elsewhere.
Heritage and belief
The legitimacy of religion's presence in a national public sphere arises, according to the ruling climate of opinion and also according to the regime of religious regulation in force in Europe, from two sources which are difficult to reconcile: on the one hand there are institutional arrangements for state-religion relations which have been built on the assumption that religion is intuitively recognizable due to its character as a national heritage or tradition, as a social convention rather than a set of examination questions (i.e. doctrine); but on the other hand formal provisions governing religion in the public and even the private sphere (such as circumcision, rules about kosher/hallal meat and parental prerogatives in their children's upbringing) are dictated by the secular and universalist requirement of non-discrimination and non-favouritism, and they assume that religion has an abstract character shared by many religious traditions which can be encapsulated in bureaucratic norms and definitions. This second source tries hard to distance itself from religion as heritage, but the tension persists, complicated by migration and cultural globalization whereby religious practices are detached from ancient environments, and heritage is transplanted across political and geographical frontiers.
So while European institutions continue to reflect and express the heritage of religion in Europe and while many Europeans (whether or not they consider themselves religious) more or less sub-consciously recognize and value that heritage, Europe's multicultural and multi-religious populations are transforming the practical institutional impact of those institutions, either because as migrant populations they are bringing their traditions with them or, as roaming, globalized seekers for supernatural enlightenment, they are transporting ideas about the supernatural and about life across the globe into unfamiliar contexts (Altglas 2005; Altglas 2007 ).
There thus arises a problem of authority: should recognitions and privileges accorded over many centuries to particular religious cultures and institutions, with their hierarchies and doctrines and authorized spokesmen, be extended to all those who claim recognition as religions under expanded criteria, in circumstances where the question who or what a religious authority is and whether such an authority merits any special status or regard from the state is essentially contestable?
The weakening of religion as heritage and the concomitant proliferation of religious authorities is likely to continue ever faster if the recent decision of a German Court on circumcision (in Cologne, June 27th 2012) is to be read as a sign of things to come.
Apart from the inevitable outcry about its implications for the practice of age-old traditions -Jewish, Muslim and other -which were subsequently rectified by legislation on December 12th 2012, the ruling focused on the rights of parents to transmit their religious affiliation to their children. In the view of the court, the 'permanent and irreparable' change wrought by circumcision 'runs counter to the interests of the child, who can decide his religious affiliation himself later in life'. If this principle is upheld and extended, then the entire basis of Europe's religious regime is threatened, because all family religious rituals can be regarded as preempting the child's religious affiliation. The instance is also curious because whereas religion is usually regarded as enjoying very special exemptions and privileges with respect to the law, here it is being singled out as the one type of affiliation which parents should not impose on their children, whereas the 'imposition', for example, of language, ethnic identity, or diet, is presumably permissible. The idea, though, that any contemporary regime of religious regulation has drawn crystal-clear lines around the religious sphere is highly questionable.
Drawing lines and blurring them
In France the delineation of religious and secular spheres under the regime of laïcité is the outcome of a series of milestones each of which further thickened the frontier: the (Birnbaum 1995: 207) . (Birnbaum, 1995: 205, 209-10) . In May 2010 the Chamber of Deputies voted unanimously for another law, this time prohibiting the 'voile intégral' or 'full-face veil' (burqa or niqab) in public spaces.
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In a separate controversy surrounding the state's circumscribing of religion, an earlier panic-driven initiative, the 2001 loi anti-sectes, directed against Scientology and other cults, of remains a mere gesture which has been severely criticized by lawyers because, it raises issues of freedom of religion and speech, while adding nothing to existing provisions against kidnapping, brainwashing and the like, (Volff, 2005:113) .
In any case, that law has not given rise to effective legal action against the cults which sectors of opinion had branded abusers and practitioners of brainwashing (Altglas, 2010) . In an admittedly polemical book by Marci Hamilton which documents innumerable cases of religious prerogatives granted by the Federal and especially state governments in the US notably on taxation issues, in apparent contravention of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution (Hamilton, 2005) . The higher courts continue to duck and weave around these issues so as to avoid creating precedents on anything too religiously controversial. Both journalistic and academic accounts note that the law has fluctuated on these subjects, reflecting political pressures, and that the 1970s marked a high point in judicial assertion of separation: since then, they tell us, the claims of religious organizations have been well received by politicians concerned with the vote and also by the courts. Inherited legislation was presumably based on an assumption that services provided by institutions such as the Holy Cross Brothers would cater to the poor and destitute, but that is not necessarily the case any more, nor can the courts take account of such social impacts in deciding on their religious character.
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Judges in the US also seem unwilling to clearly delineate persons whose ministry constitutes 'a core expression of religious belief' and who therefore are entitled to tax exemptions, for this might involve distinguishing between a priest and, say, a nurse employed by a religiously sponsored or managed institution. And one can understand why: is it for the courts to decide how such core roles could be distinguished? Could they seriously require some sort of criterion like a ritual of induction? Once the underlying inherited assumptions -consensual or not, but assumed to be such -about religious belonging and belief have been relativized, once they are no longer taken as self-evident and made subject to legal-rational inspection, the issue becomes not just uncertain and contentious, but also politicized, because of the competitiveness and ambition of religious organizations and entrepreneurs and the political constituencies they can influence. So as the state, in the person of judges, recoils from defining what counts as religious, on the grounds that to do so would be to violate the fourteenth amendment provision of free exercise and non-establishment, religious groups find more and more exemptions and protections within the state.
Ancient understandings become arms in new struggles
This politicization is not a matter of ideological and policy-related pronouncements by religious organizations, which are a standard feature of any remotely democratic state-religion regime. Rather it is about the destabilization of ancient implicit
European understandings originating in a set of largely forgotten cultural assumptions, which retain their legitimacy in the name of new ways of being religious and of being a religion. The new ways are firstly a shift in the shared understanding of what counts as legitimate religious authority: the idea that religious authority lies with professionals in a hierarchy committed, for example, to celibacy, the renunciation of worldly possessions, the wearing of distinctive dress, or a devotion to a life of learning, sacrifice, and charity, and secondly, following from this shift away from hierarchical authority, the mobilization of personal belief as sufficient authority to claim the same state recognition and the same exemptions once accorded to recognized and recognizable church hierarchies. This gives rise to frequent disputes.
For example, the ideals of free exercise and non-establishment were developed in a world in which birth, marriage and death were a matter for religious authorities and the state had no involvement in people's reproductive behaviour, or in medical treatment in extreme old age, not to speak of the certification of same-sex marriages.
Such issues have fuelled demands for special recognition of the religious for example from officials refusing to certify same-sex marriages or pressures for the state to fund religious schools operating a regime of strict observance. These concessions could almost amount to a separate category of citizenship under which religious affiliation exempts individuals and organizations from universal rules which in most democratic regimes are supposed to apply irrespective of 'race, religion or creed': as these demands are met so religion becomes a benefit or entitlement for followers, rather than a burden or sacrifice by people (monks, pastors etc.) whom society as a whole
should subsidize, and difficult questions arise as to whether respect for religious freedom and for its benefits to society take precedence over other policies, for example to protect children's rights, or to protect parents' rights (as in anti-cult controversies). Thus we have to find a line not only between the state and religion, but also between freedom of expression and religious privilege, so that we can explain and justify why religious freedom requires privileged treatment additional to freedom of expression. This search is compounded by polarized factions and tendencies within religious groups, making it difficult for states to find legitimate negotiating partners ('interlocuteurs valables').
These conflicts could be described as the less visible, even dark, side of the 'vicarious 
Religion as an inclusive or exclusive good?
The discussion also has to go beyond the questions of religious freedom and exemption, to ask whether religious organizations which practice exclusiveness and have no visible or answerable authority beyond a local manager (i.e. pastor) can claim the same exemptions as those which are more institutionalized. It is worth reminding ourselves that those forms of Christian religion which benefit from state bias embody a religiosity open to more or less everyone, provide parish churches serving every square kilometre of a given national territory, and are neither demanding nor exclusive, and hence fit well with vicarious religion. This contrasts with today's most rapidly growing Christian tendency, the evangelical churches, which in principle require their followers to pay a regular tithe of one tenth their pre-tax income.
Sometimes openness is reflected in formal arrangements: for example, in England the established Church, and in Wales the disestablished Church, are obliged, subject to minor exceptions, to marry anyone who asks to be married by a priest -a centuries- "lukewarm" faith offers the best chances for tolerance and freedom. In several of these countries the religious field has been opened to competition in response to 'international religious human rights-ism' promoted by 'well-funded transnational pressure groups' which have built alliances with the most conservative elements in the national churches (Hann, 2000; Hann, 2006) , leading to bitter controversies over women's reproductive rights, predictably, but also little enhancement of freedomaccompanied by tacit acquiescence in attitudes to Jews and actions against Gypsies, which, to say the least, inspire a legitimate fear for their freedom and even their safety, and hardly enhance human rights.
Hann is here making a discrete argument against the rapid adoption of secularism or of an unrestricted 'religious market' in countries where the field was previously dominated by a national church or 'confessionalist' regime (Koenig, forthcoming) because the sudden shift can tear apart the social fabric. The point about politicization can also be formulated in terms of Daniéle Hervieu-Léger's emphasis on the openness and inclusiveness of a Church which, being charged with the redemption of all mankind, distinguished between the strict observance and personal sacrifice required of its virtuosi, and the minimal observance asked of its followers (Hervieu-Léger,
2001
: 141), in contrast to conversion-led movements which demand heavy sacrifice from all followers. Sects, unlike national churches, are distinguished by their inwardlooking focus and the intense personal commitment required of their members. But one can go further, and ask whether the absence of even a nominally national Church is not a factor behind the political involvement of churches in the US, which in recent history has ranged from the civil rights movement to the Tea Party and the current culture wars, described by Putnam and Campbell (2010) as the bitterest ideological battles that country has ever seen. The polarization appears to be related to the openness of the religious market and invites two observations. One is that where there is a history of hegemony or establishment there are fairly stable institutional arrangements for the management of the interaction between the state and religious bodies, such as the French schooling arrangements we have mentioned (absent in the US). These arrangements may not be strictly compliant with a demanding interpretation of separation, and they are also very likely to be biased against minority religions, but in the European countries where they prevail there has hitherto, in the 20 th century, been a degree of tolerance for that, and a (still) limited pressure for judicial intervention in drawing detailed definitions and frontiers -an ultimately impossible task for judicial reasoning, as the contrasting interpretations of the ECHR by Edmunds and Koenig illustrate (Edmunds, 2012; Koenig, forthcoming In that respect this argument diverges from the (implicit but rarely enunciated) assumption underlying the economics of religion school, in the writings of Rodney
Stark and his associates, that the less regulated a regime of state-religion relations the better not only for religious organizations but also for society as a whole. In this perspective, religion need only justify its benefit to its own followers, not to society as a whole, so that the inclusiveness of a church is not a value (Iannaccone, 1994; Iannacone, 1997; Stark, 1997; Stark and Finke, 2000; Lehmann, 2010) . The implication also is that, pace Grace Davie's earlier account of Europe (2002) reason in a plural society by allowing scope for a minority group to administer its affairs according to its own convictions' (Williams, 2008: 268) . Of course the lecture was lambasted in the tabloid press, as advocacy of the introduction of Sharia, whereas his true purpose was to insist on the need for secular arrangements precsely to protect people within minority communities from the violation of their universal rights, by bringing Sharia under the protective umbrella of the legal system (Williams, 2008: 271-2). The Archbishop, like the prison chaplains, was giving voice to a liberal secularist, but obviously far from atheistic, mindset: religion at the service of society and the world (which is not reducible to charitable giving).
Conversion-led movements and the secularization of religious reason
The dynamic forces in religion as option or preference are conversion-led movements.
I use this term so as to encompass all sorts of movements in Christianity, Judaism and it into a vast global operation and has also been successfully adopted by many others.
Political involvement of conversion-led movements
On the whole, Pentecostals in Latin America have not posed serious problems for regimes of religious regulation: their involvement in politics is largely of a corporatist kind, seeking office and resources, and they do not adopt the kind of politicalreligious rhetoric that is heard in the United States, whether on the left, as in the civil rights movement, or associated with fundamentalist Christianity and linked to issues such as civil rights, social policy, taxation and government expenditure (Fonseca, 2008; Freston, 2008; Gomes 2011; Machado, 2006) . them from tax but not from the obligation to supply tax returns (Giumbelli, 2008) But while the regimes vary so much, the conversion-led movements, as products or at least correlates of globalization, have numerous features in common across the world.
They are by no means majority movements, but their impact has been far out of proportion to their numbers because within the religious field they are much more dynamic, and their followers more committed than other tendencies which conceive religious adherence differently. Indeed, one central argument is that regimes of statereligion relations have great difficulty dealing with religious movements and subcultures which demand high levels of commitment from their followers, because their institutions -whatever their origin -have been adapted to deal with low-intensity religion in which clergy do the hard work and the followers follow. Liberal secularists must now take these phenomena seriously and develop ways of including them, just as the Archbishop wanted to include Sharia, rather than dismissing them as mad, irrational or ignorant. London and Manchester, where a similar arrangement allows the state to pay for the secular curriculum but not religious learning. 7. Hence the classic phrase 'les juifs fous de la République' -'Jews madly in love with the Republic'. 8. The exact text prohibits the following: 'le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse'. 9. The penalty is symbolic: €150 or a citizenship course. The penalty for inciting someone to wear it is much heavier: €30,000. The number of women wearing a burqa at the time was derisory, but of course has risen since. 10. The intimidatingly named MIVILUDES (Mission interministérielle de vigilance et de lutte contre les dérives sectaires) the non-statutory body established in the wake of the law to monitor and fight against the spread of sectarian patterns of behaviour, makes a point on the opening page of its website, of stating that its task is not to define a sect nor to keep a list of sects, but rather to keep abreast of the 'dérives sectaires'. 
